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STATE COMPELLED SPIRITUAL REVELATION: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS AS A
CONDITION OF DRUNK DRIVING PROBATION
by Christopher K. Smith*
On any given night thousands of Americans drink and drive, and each year more than
one million people are arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI).' Following a wave of
legislation to combat drunk driving in the 1980s,' the detection, arrest and punishment of drunk
drivers became a hotbed for constitutional inquiry.3 Roadblocks, per se intoxication statutes,
administrative license revocations, and mandatory jail sentences have been scrutinized by courts
weighing individual rights against state initiatives to fight drunk driving. The more prevalent
practice of rehabilitating convicted drunk drivers through self-help groups such as Alcoholics
Anonymous (AA) has received far less attention.4
Due to both a recognition of alcoholism as a disease and a desire to attack drunk
driving at its root, state legislatures rewriting DWI statutes uniformly included education
and rehabilitative programs as part of DWI sentencing.5 Although this rehabilitation
J.D. candidate 1993, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary.
In 1989, 1,333,327 people were arrested for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 174 (1990). Between
1970 and 1986 DWI arrests increased 223%. JAMES JACOBS, DRUNK DRIVING: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA at
xviii (1989). The chance of being detected and arrested for drunk driving is estimated to be I in 500.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, JAILING DRUNK DRIVERS: THE IMPACT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 1 (1985) [hereinafter JAILING DRUNK DRIVERS].
2 At the height of the legislation explosion in 1982 and 1983, state legislatures throughout all 50 states
enacted or strengthened 500 drunk driving laws. Theodore A. Bruce & Patricia R. Bruce, The Legislative
Response to the Drunk Driving Dilemma: An Empirical Analysis of its Success and Failure, 33 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 177 (1988). The heightened level of statehouse attention was due to awareness-raising groups like
Mothers Against Drunk Driving and Students Against Drunk Driving. Id. Additionally, prerequisites for
federal highway funds pressured states to adopt statutory recommendations from a presidential taskforce. See
23 U.S.C. § 408 (1988); 23 C.F.R. § 1309.5 (a), (b) (1992). Two hundred twenty-three new drunk driving
laws were passed in 45 states in 1985 alone. Ray McAllister, The Drunken Driving Crackdown, Is It
Working? 74 A.B.A. J. 52, 55 (Sept. 1988).
' Many of the steps in the drunk driving enforcement process have been challenged on constitutional
grounds. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (affirming sobriety
checkpoint roadblocks over Fourth Amendment claim of unreasonable search and seizure); South Dakota v.
Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (holding that admission into evidence of refusal to submit to blood-alcohol test
does not offend Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979)
(upholding license revocation for refusal to take breath test over due process claim); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966) (affirming implied consent statutes which require drivers to submit to blood tests over
Fifth Amendment challenge of self-incrimination); Illinois v. Baker, 511 N.E.2d 219 (Il1. App. Ct. 1987)
(Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination may apply to pre- or post-sentence alcohol evaluation);
State v. Leary, 556 A.2d 1328 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989) (striking down New Jersey DWI counseling
program because not within statutory authority); State v. Bouldin, 717 S.W.2d 584 (Tenn. 1986) (overturning
seizure of Cadillac as condition of DWI probation on due process grounds).
' See discussion infra notes 212-250 and accompanying text; Farmer v. Coughlin, No. 84 Civ. 7587
(CBM), 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11294; Jaco v. Shields, 507 F. Supp. 67 (W.D. Va. 1981); Youle v. Edgar,
526 N.E.2d 894 (I11. App. Ct. 1988); State v. Norfolk, Crim. No. 3588 (Cir. Ct. Queen Anne's Co., Md.
Mar. 16, 1989).
' Every state except North Dakota has some rehabilitation element in its drunk driving statutes.
Nineteen states have a mandatory education or rehabilitation program for all drunk drivers, while thirty-one
have programs available at the judge's discretion. See AMERICAN INSURANCE INSTITUTE, DIGEST OF STATE
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element varies among jurisdictions, a description of one drunk driver's post-conviction
experience illustrates how such programs typically work.
Found guilty of drunk driving following a plea bargain, John Norfolk faced a
choice in sentencing offered throughout the country to first time drunk drivers: license
suspension and possible imprisonment as provided by the state statute, or suspension of
the sentence with probation under the state's conditions. 6 Following Norfolk's choice of
probation, the probation department ordered an alcohol evaluation to determine the
rehabilitative and educational needs of Norfolk. Although all DWI probations will include
alcohol and driving education, the evaluation designates alcohol abusers and chronic
alcoholics. These probationers must complete twelve or more weeks of therapy to satisfy
probation and stay out of jail.7 In Queen Anne's County, like many jurisdictions
throughout the country, the therapy rehabilitation requirement is met by documenting
attendance at two AA meetings per week.'
In satisfying his probation requirement, the drunk driver may be surprised to
learn that his successful participation in AA hinges on "admitting powerlessness" over
alcohol and turning to God to cure him of his shortcomings.9 He may be shocked as
members rise at the end of the meeting, join hands, and recite the Lord's Prayer. Despite
the discomfort that may result, the probationer will likely prefer AA to the alternatives
of jail time, loss of license, or increased fines.
For John Norfolk, an atheist, even the benefits of probation could not outweigh
his non-religious conviction: "I'm not violating my probation by refusing to go to the
meetings, I'm sticking up for my constitutional rights."'" With the help of the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Norfolk argued that requiring him to attend AA as a
condition of probation violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment." Although County Circuit Court Judge John Sause focused on the
inefficacy of mandating any self-help group, he agreed that to specifically require AA was
LAWS RELATING TO DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS OR ALCOHOL (1988). The most likely
sources of compulsory Alcoholics Anonymous are the trial court and the probation department rather than
statute or rule. See discussion infra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
6 See State v. Norfolk, Crim. No. 3588 (Cir. Ct. Queen Anne's Co., Md. Mar. 16, 1989). Norfolk's
suspended sentence called for 20 days in jail. The Maryland statute calls for up to one year in jail for first
time offenders. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. §§ 21-902(a), 27-101(k) (1987). See generally B. Drummond
Ayres, Atheist Challenges Order to Attend A.A. Meetings, N.Y. TIMES, July 1I, 1988, at A12 (describing
Norfolk's challenge); Ron Gasbarro, Another Road to Recovery; A New Group Offers Alternative to AA,
WASH. POST, May 14, 1991, at D5 (discussing challenges to AA sentencing).
' Defendant's Memorandum to the Court at 1, State v. Norfolk, No. D713675 (Dist. Ct. Queen Anne's
Co., Md. Apr. 1988); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641 (a)(l)(ii)(l) (1992) (mandating alcohol treatment or
education for drunk drivers granted probation).
Like many jurisdictions, the Queen Anne's County Alcohol Services Clinic had determined that AA
should supplement the county alcohol clinic as part of probation for problem drinkers.
9 The first step of the Alcoholics Anonymous twelve step program asks the alcoholic to "admit
powerlessness over alcohol," and the third step dictates that one must "[make] a decision to turn our will
and our lives over to God as we understand Him." ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICES, INC.,
ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS 58-61 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS].
'o Ayres, supra note 6, at A12.
Ellen Luff, panel attorney for the ACLU of Maryland, served as Norfolk's attorney. Her memorandum to
the district court cited the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment as well as Article 36
of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution. Defendant's Memorandum to the Court, State v.
Norfolk, No. D713675 (Dist. Ct. Queen Anne's Co., Md. Apr. 1988). The district court approved mandatory AA,
largely because "AA seems to be the only thing that has proven successful in the treatment of the alcoholic."
Ellen Luff, The First Amendment and Drug and Alcohol Treatment Programs, in LESSONS FROM LEGAL DRUGS
262.
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unconstitutional. 2 In reaching this conclusion, one must assign great weight to individual
liberty, because on the other end of the constitutional scale is the overwhelming public
interest of rehabilitating and punishing drunk drivers.
A contrasting judicial analysis of mandatory AA highlighted the balance
between individual rights and the state's interest. Approving Illinois' regulations
requiring AA for some drunk drivers, an appellate court of Illinois stated, "It is
abundantly clear that the Secretary has adopted a program designed to remove
intoxicated drivers from Illinois roads and highways. Part of that program is to
demand that problematic users of alcohol prove they have a support system that
makes them deal with their problem."' 3 Discounting a freedom of religion claim,
the Illinois court further held, "The primary function of Alcoholics Anonymous is
to cope with the disease of alcoholism."' 4
Compulsory Alcoholics Anonymous as a condition of probation presents a
conflictbetween individual rights under the First Amendment and state initiatives
to combat drunk driving. Generally, the rehabilitation and education approach to
drunk driving is wise policy,' 5 and state-offered education or rehabilitation
programs do not infringe on constitutional rights. Constitutional questions arise only
when the state, by statute or through the courts, compels attendance at AA, an
arguably religious, 6  admittedly spiritual,'" and purposefully indoctrinating
organization. 's
This Note will analyze the constitutionality of compulsory AA as a
condition of drunk driving probation, and the public policy implications of the
constitutional challenge. First, this Note will investigate the characteristics of AA
which conflict with First Amendment rights. It will discuss whether probation
conditions qualify as state action, the status of probation as a right or a privilege,
and the effect of a conviction on constitutional protections. The Note will then
analyze compulsory AA under the religion clauses, freedom of expression, and
freedom of thought protections of the First Amendment. It will survey how courts
have addressed AA probation requirements. After suggesting the protections against
mandatory AA provided by the Constitution, the Note will discuss the balance
between these individual rights and public policy, and propose solutions to
accommodate both constitutional rights and effective public policy.
'2 Transcript of Disposition at 6-9, State v. Norfolk, Crim. No. 3588 (Cir. Ct. Queen Anne's Co., Md.
Mar. 16, 1989).
'3 Youle v. Edgar, 526 N.E.2d 894, 898 (I11. App. Ct. 1988).
14 Id. at 899.
'5 "There are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil to one who is striking at the root." Bruce &
Bruce, supra note 2, at 177 (quoting Henry David Thoreau). Given the medical and psychological
recognition of alcoholism as a disease, it seems logical to combat alcohol related violations with rehabilita-
tion aimed at curbing drinking. In contrast, mandatory jail sentences, another popular anti-drunk driving
initiative, punish a disease-related offense without attempting to cure the disease. See, e.g., Driver v.
Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
I6 See discussion supra notes 9-12, and infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
7 ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 9, at 569-572. Some regard AA as "[using] religious
principles .. . although [the organization is] not religious in nature." Richard Thoreson & Frank Budd, Self-
Help Groups and Other Procedures for Treating Alcohol Problems, in TREATMENT AND PREVENTION OF
ALCOHOL PROBLEMS 157, 173 (W. Miles Cox, ed. 1987).
" "Alcoholics Anonymous admits that successful participation demands a complete change in lifestyle
and belief system. An alcoholic is never cured, but must rely on AA support to maintain abstinence. The
twelve steps clearly represent indoctrination. See discussion infra notes 22-62 and accompanying text. See
also, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 9, at 58-61.
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I. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
The rehabilitative element of drunk driving sentencing provides numerous
questions pertaining to psychology, social policy, and the law. The question of whether
society should punish offenses related to alcohol, arguably uncontrollable if the defendant
is alcoholic, has been addressed inconclusively by courts.' 9 Most prominent is the
questionable efficacy of any self-help or rehabilitative efforts when compelled rather than
voluntary. 20 Rather than tackling these policy questions, this Note focuses on objections
to compulsory AA based in the Constitution's protection of individual liberty.2'
A. The Spirit of Alcoholics Anonymous
Characteristics of state compelled AA that implicate constitutional rights can be
analyzed on several tiers. The founding principles and the literature of AA demonstrate
a religious approach to alcohol recovery.22 In addition to elements comparable to
traditional religion, the program is unabashedly spiritual in nature.23 Beyond the official
tenets and practices of AA, the actual administration of the program may result in
additional infringement of rights, as demonstrated by the accounts of AA veterans.24
The preliminary debate involves whether AA should be characterized as religious
or merely spiritual and religion-neutral. From various perspectives, AA has been viewed
as a community support system, a social movement, an adjunct to therapy, a way of life,
a religious movement, 25 even a cult. 26 Bill Wilson founded AA in 1934 after a religious
awakening, and AA's founding principles indicate a vital role for religion.2 ' The AA
philosophy was derived from three belief systems:28 William James' concept of
surrendering to a power greater than ourselves; Carl Jung's belief that spiritual needs
require a spiritual experience to effect successful change; and the tenets of the Oxford
Group, a religious revivalist organization, which mandate the confession of bad acts and
the recognition of the need for change, with the desired result of direct access to God.29
"9 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), extended the addiction analysis of Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962), to alcoholism. This constitutional inquiry focused on whether it is cruel and unusual
punishment to convict an alcoholic for public drunkenness. Powell, 392 U.S. at 535-536. Alcoholism has
never been successfully cited as a constitutional defense to drunk driving.
20 Dissenting in Henson v. Employment Security Department, and citing psychological studies, Judge
Durham argued that AA cannot be successful for everyone. 779 P.2d 715, 721 (Wash. 1989). "[M]ankind
has yet found few ways to ... rehabilitate an individual ... unless that individual is willing to be
rehabilitated." Transcript of Disposition at 6, State v. Norfolk, Crim. No. 3588 (Cir. Ct. Queen Anne's Co.,
Md. Mar. 16, 1989).
2' Although compulsory AA is addressed herein, the analysis would apply to other public or private
therapy or rehabilitative efforts that included similar religious or indoctrinating characteristics.
22 See generally ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 9.
23 id.
24 See infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
25 Thoreson & Budd, supra note 17, at 164 (citing 1979 study by Gartner & Reisman).
26 Id. at 173. See generally CHARLES BUFE, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS: CULT OR CURE? 82-103
(1991) (considering the similarities and differences between AA and typical "cults").
27 Bill Wilson described his awakening: "All about me and through me there was a wonderful feeling
of presence, and I thought to myself, 'So this is the God of the preachers!' A great peace stole over me and
I thought, 'No matter how wrong things seem to be, they are still all right. Things are all right with God and
His world.' " ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICES, INC., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS COMES OF AGE
63 (1963) [hereinafter AA COMES OF AGE].
2' Thoreson & Budd, supra note 17, at 165.
29 Id. See also BUFE, supra note 26, at 35-37 (recounting the beginnings of AA).
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In its founding years, AA was closely linked to the Oxford Group Movement,3"
and was clearly religious in nature.3' Following his own conversion, Bill Wilson sought
out alcoholics on whom to apply the Oxford principles of admission of fault and seeking
recovery and retribution through God.32 Early AA members also attended Oxford Group
meetings, and AA co-founder Dr. Robert Smith referred to his group as "the alcoholic
squadron of the Akron Oxford Group."33 Due to differences with the Oxford Group and
other reasons, 34 the fledgling AA severed its formal connections with the Oxford Group
Movement in 1937.35 Nonetheless, the religious tenets of the Oxford Group remain at
the heart of AA, as each of the twelve steps of AA is traceable to the teachings of Frank
Buchman.36
Alcoholics Anonymous, or "The Big Book," defines the AA philosophy.3 7 "The
Big Book' '38 serves as the practice manual for AA, by enumerating the "Twelve Steps"
and "Twelve Traditions" which are the foundation of the AA program. 39 The twelve
steps of AA make reference to God and instruct the alcoholic to turn to God to cure his
defects.4" Most importantly, the first step requires the AA member to admit powerless-
30 The Oxford Group Movement was also known as the Oxford Groups, Buchmanism, and Moral Re-
Armament. BUFE, supra note 26, at 16. The movement was founded by Frank Buchman around 1908, and
through the years focused on evangelism on college campuses in America and England, then attempted to
organize in South Africa, and finally proselytized largely among wealthy Americans. See id. at 16-31.
i" ld. at 16, 36-39.
32 Id. at 36-39.
13 Id. at 38.
3' Although Bill Wilson maintained faith in the principles of the Oxford Group Movement, he
believed alcoholics needed to be fed the ideas "with teaspoons rather than buckets." Id. at 39 (quoting AA
COMES OF AGE, supra note 27, at 75). The Oxford Group in New York apparently encouraged Wilson to
focus on the work of the Oxford Group rather than only his alcoholism sub-group. Id. AA founders also
worried that a close link to the Buchmanites might risk alienation of the Catholic church and Catholic alco-
holics. Id. Additionally, in 1936 Frank Buchman had expressed controversial views approving of Adolf
Hitler, providing good reason for AA to distance itself from his movement. See id. at 23-26 (discussing
Buchman's 1936 interview in which he "thank[ed] heaven for a man like Adolf Hitler").
3 Id. at 39.
36 Id. at 41. Despite the clear link between the Oxford Group and the twelve steps of AA, and the fact
that the twelve steps have remained unchanged through fifty years of AA growth, Charles Bufe observes,
"probably not one member in 100 of A.A.... has more than the foggiest concept of where the ... pro-
gram[ ] originated." Id. at 52-53.
31 See generally ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 9.
38 ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, a.k.a. "The Big Book," has been analogized to the Bible. Thoreson &
Budd, supra note 17, at 171.
9 For a discussion of the religious nature of the twelve steps, see BUFE, supra note 26, at 62-72.
0 ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 9, at 58-71. The twelve steps dictate:
1. We admit[ ] we were powerless over alcohol - that our lives had become unmanageable.
2. Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity.
3. Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God as we understood
Him.
4. Made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves.
5. Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being the exact nature of our
wrongs.
6. Were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of character.
7. Humbly asked Him to remove our shortcomings.
8. Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to make amends to them
all.
9. Made direct amends to such people wherever possible, except when to do so would injure
them or others.
10. Continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong promptly admitted it.
11. Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious contact with God as we
understood Him, praying only for knowledge of His will for us and the power to carry that out.
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ness over alcohol; the second to recognize that only a "Power greater than ourselves
could restore us to sanity.' '4 1 At the third step one has "[m]ade a decision to turn our
will and our lives over to the care of God as we underst[and] Him." At the sixth step one
is "entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of character;" the alcoholic then
"[h]umbly ask[s] Him to remove our shortcomings" at the seventh step.42 The second
of AA's "Twelve Traditions" states, "There is but one ultimate authority - a loving
God as He may express Himself. ' 43 AA meetings end with recitation of the Lord's
Prayer, and may open with the Serenity prayer."
Despite proposing a clear and important role for God in the alcoholic's path to
salvation, the AA organization denies the religious nature of the program.45 AA proposes
that the key to recovery is "an unsuspected inner resource," viewed as "a Power greater
than themselves," 46 which it terms spiritual and not religious.
Given the constitutional definition of religion, AA's definition of themselves as
non-religious rests largely on semantics.47 For example, contrary to AA's view, the
Attorney General of South Dakota termed AA a religious society for tax purposes.4
Additionally, a Wisconsin court relied on AA literature and expert witnesses to reach the
conclusion that religious activities were a part of AA's treatment and, further, that there
was no merit in AA's attempt to distinguish between spirituality and religion. 9
Religion Clause jurisprudence discerns constitutional violations when religion is
favored over non-religion," indicating that the mere requisite of recognizing a power
greater than oneself is religious in nature. Furthermore, an organization's self-definition
should not govern the determination of the organization's religiousness. Courts investigate
the character of the group in its actual, not claimed, activities, to determine religious
nature.5'
Nonetheless, courts and commentators, with little explanation, often accept that
"[w]illingness, honesty, and openmindedness," rather than a religious transformation,
"are the essentials of [AA] recovery." 52 Past deference to AA's religious neutrality
12. Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these steps, we tried to carry this
message to alcoholics, and to practice these principles in all our affairs.
Id. at 59-60 (emphasis in original).
" Id. at 59.
42 Id.
4' ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICES, INC., TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS 132
(1980).
44 Although each AA group enjoys significant autonomy, the guaranteed program consistencies include
admission of powerlessness and turning to a higher being for a spiritual solution. Thoreson & Budd, supra
note 17, at 167.
45 The AA "preamble," read at the beginning of each meeting, reinforces that AA has no affiliation
with any "particular faith, sect or denomination." ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 9, at xiv. AA
representatives term the organization "spiritual." "We suggest that you develop a relationship with a higher
power," stated an AA spokesperson. Ayres, supra note 6, at A12.
46 ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 9, at 569-570.
" BUFE, supra note 26, at 92.
'8 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-4-9 (1989) (stating Attorney General's opinion that AA falls under
the tax exemption for property owned by a religious society).
'9 BUFE, supra note 26, at 92.
" See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1963).
5 Courts must examine the nature of the organization in practice and as administered, not merely
defer to self-definition. See Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
52 People v. Hoy, 158 N.W.2d 436, 444-45 n.7 (Mich. 1968). Although they proceed to define AA as
a "special community or 'cult,' " Thoreson & Budd write that AA literature "uses religious principles
although it is not religious in nature." Thoreson & Budd, supra note 17, at 173.
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ignores AA's doctrines and practice as well as developed judicial definitions of religion.
Neutrality is not accepted so readily by AA participants: "I knew AA wasn't for me ....
They made us say the Lord's Prayer... I'm an atheist. Show me something secular and
I might be motivated to join.""
Regardless of the religious aspects of AA, the organization readily admits that
the program is spiritual in nature. Radical life change is the underlying goal of AA,
effectuated by the "alteration of major belief systems." 54 The spiritual overhaul required
by AA poses constitutional questions because of its highly indoctrinating nature. The
mindset of admitting powerlessness often requires one to redefine one's identity. A
twenty-six year AA member and counselor explained, "AA is a way of life. The notion
of surrender, to admit that one is an alcoholic, begins to redefine who we are.'"" This
dramatic approach is designed for "the uncontrolled drinker who sincerely desires to
achieve sobriety" and will go to any length to achieve it.56 It works for thousands of
alcoholics.57 However, along with the religious aspects of AA, the program's spiritually
indoctrinating nature presents the question of whether government can compel such a
forceful change in beliefs.58
The actual administration of the AA program increases the potential for rights
infringement through both its religious and spiritual elements. Not surprisingly, group
leaders and many members tend to be longtime alcoholics and strong advocates of the AA
program.59 The resultant outlook often includes a recognition of powerlessness bordering
on self-derogation, 6° and complete dependence on the AA program to maintain
sobriety. 6' An alcoholism therapist commented, "In AA, it is constantly pounded into
the alcoholic's head that you cannot stop drinking by yourself, that you are powerless, that
without AA you will die, end up in the gutter."
62
A brief comparison of AA practices with constitutional precedent in which the
Supreme Court struck down statutes or programs demonstrates that a state's sentencing
partnership with AA deserves constitutional scrutiny. For instance, the recitation of the
Lord's Prayer invokes the freedom of religion, because the Supreme Court has attached
3 Gasbarro, supra note 6, at D5. "They were praying and talking about God about half the time at
the meetings I went to," said John Norfolk, who challenged his AA probation requirement. Ayres, supra
note 6, at A 12.
5' Thoreson & Budd, supra note 17, at 164.
" Gasbarro, supra note 6, at D5.
56 Thoreson & Budd, supra note 17, at 166. This requisite has clear implications for the
effectiveness of a policy mandating AA for those who have yet to admit alcoholism and do not share
sobriety as a goal.
" With over 73,000 chapters worldwide, AA has helped thousands attain sobriety. U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SEVENTH SPECIAL REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND
HEALTH 412 (1989) [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH].
5 Conforming with AA's view that the radical change required is spiritual, not religious, some argue
that in the modem context, the spiritual experience is more commonly just a requisite change in personality.
Thoreson & Budd, supra note 17, at 164-65.
5' See generally, BUFE, supra note 26, at 13-15 (describing a "typical" AA meeting).
60 At this author's first AA meeting, the session leader shared, "Let's face it, we're the pits of the
world. We are losers," in explaining how members cannot count on themselves to combat alcoholism, but
must count on the support group. Oakton Chapter of AA, Fairfax, Virginia (Jan. 1990).
61 AA dependence has been described as substituting one addiction for another. Gasbarro, supra note
6, at D5. AA counsels that alcoholics are never cured, but are recovering, and can avoid remission only
through continued participation in AA. See generally ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 9.
62 Gasbarro, supra note 6, at D5 (quoting Sherry Schneider). A former AA participant said: "At AA,
they told me I would have to come everyday for the rest of my life ... I hated the idea of becoming
dependent on another thing." Id.
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special significance to the "reading of verses. ' 6 3 Free exercise cases hold that the
government cannot deny an equal share of rights or benefits because of an individual's
religious beliefs. 6 Furthermore, the Constitution protects the "freedom of mind, ' 65 and
an individual must be free to reach his own beliefs through his own conscience rather than
by state coercion.66
The religious, spiritual, and indoctrinating characteristics of AA implicate several
hallmarks of individual liberty, particularly the freedoms of religion, expression, and
conscience. Before analyzing mandatory AA attendance under First Amendment
protections, however, the imposition of probation conditions must qualify as a state action
to which constitutional safeguards apply.67
B. Probation Conditions as State Action and the Effect of Conviction
In order to determine that a probation requirement of AA is a state action,
it is helpful to understand how drunk drivers are compelled, or required, 68 to attend
AA. Although some DWI or rehabilitation statutes mandate cooperation with AA or
endorse AA principles, 69 drunk drivers are not compelled to attend AA by specific
legislation. Rather, rules made pursuant to state drunk driving statutes7° create a
post-conviction system for determining the appropriate punishment and rehabilitation
for the drunk driver. These post-conviction evaluations determine whether the
sentence will include AA.
Rules to determine sentencing, a common source of mandatory AA,7" typically
include the process and criteria for classifying the defendant's level of alcoholism. This
classification translates into a given rehabilitation program, which is recommended by the
probation department and generally followed by the court.
Illinois' regulations for satisfying probation following drunk driving convic-
tions72 exemplify the specific regulatory structures in many states. The Illinois
regulations require an interview of the defendant by the probation department to classify
the drunk driver in one of three levels of alcohol/chemical dependency. The rules include
criteria for each level. For instance, inability to stop or control drinking, blackouts, and
the development of withdrawal symptoms upon stopping or reducing use will place the
63 "Reading of verses ... possesses a devotional and religious character and constitutes in
effect a religious observance." Abington v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203, 210 (1963) (striking down state
laws requiring passages from the Bible or the Lord's Prayer to be read in school, even if individuals
can be excused).
6 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988) (free exercise is
violated if a government act coerces an individual to violate religious beliefs or penalizes religious activity
by "denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.");
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
65 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
' Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
67 See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
68 "Judges sometimes give those convicted of drunk driving a choice: 90 days in jail or 90 AA
meetings. Who wouldn't choose the latter?" Gasbarro, supra note 6, at D5.
69 See infra notes 252-253, regarding various treatment of AA in statutes.
70 These rules have the force and effect of law. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); Youle
v. Edgar 526 N.E.2d 894, 897 (I11. App. Ct. 1988).
7' For examples of states which determine sentencing, including a rehabilitation requirement,
following an alcohol evaluation, see Illinois, Virginia, Maryland, and Missouri regulations for alcohol
evaluations.
72 See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 92, § 1001.400 et seq., 1001.410, 1001.440(b)(3) (1987) (outlining
the rehabilitation requirements for a drunk driver classified as a "Level III" chronic alcoholic to reacquire
driving privileges following revocation); 10 IIl. Reg. 4558, 4593 (1986).
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defendant in the "Level III" disease/addiction phase. 3 The level III defendant must
establish an "ongoing support/recovery program" to satisfy probation. 4 Although the
actual compulsion to attend AA comes from the sentencing court, in these states the
legislature's role in compelling "AA is evident.75
Of course, the most prevalent form of state compulsion to AA is judicial
imposition of AA in sentencing, by requiring AA as a probation condition.76 Partnership
between courts and AA may be uniform, resulting in AA for every drunk driver,77 or
invoked only for certain defendants. AA sentences may be the result of an enumerated
state or local policy,7" or the creation of the district court judge.79 Rules or sentences
may specifically mandate AA or may only require an acceptable support program.80 Even
when AA is not specifically required by the sentencing court, it may in fact be mandated
within a probation department's program.8" AA may also be the only satisfactory
"support group" in the locale, or at least the only free one. 2
Whether based in state statutes and rules or judicial initiative, participation in AA
has become an integral part of drunk driving sentencing in many jurisdictions. Although
judicial sentencing certainly qualifies as state action and therefore may not infringe
13 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 92, § 1001.410 (1987); 10 I11. Reg. 4558, 4587 (1986). Although the
interview and classification of defendants prior to mandating AA may make compulsory counsel-
ing/indoctrination more palatable, it should be noted that a large portion of drunk drivers are put in the
addicted/alcoholic or abuser categories. See BARENT F. LANDSTREET, THE DRINKING DRIVER: THE ALCOHOL
SAFETY ACTION PROGRAMS 59, 63 (1977). Furthermore, many courts or probation departments require AA
without such targeting. See Jail Time Advocated for Intoxicated Drivers, PROPERTY & CASUALTY, Jan. 2,
1989, at 31. If all AA sentences were based on targeting criteria, and those criteria accurately reflected
chronic alcoholism, the question addressed in this note would be very different.
"' ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 92, § 1001.440(b)(3) (1987); 10 I11. Reg. 4558, 4593 (1986). This ongoing
support program requirement is effectively both a mandatory part of the defendant's probation and a
necessary requirement to be eligible for renewal of privileges after probation, such as the lifting of a license
suspension. See Youle v. Edgar, 526 N.E.2d 894, 898 (111. App. Ct. 1988).
" In fact, such regulations are imposed on courts to create a uniform approach to drunk driving: "It is
abundantly clear that the Secretary has adopted a program designed to remove intoxicated drivers from
Illinois roads and highways." Youle, 526 N.E.2d at 898.
76 An AA spokesperson at New York headquarters stated: "We've been cooperating with the
courts on alcohol cases for more than 35 years in at least three-fourths of the states." Ayres, supra note
6, at A12.
77 In Quincy, Massachusetts, the court sentences every drunk driver to AA, up to four meetings
weekly for up to 30 weeks. Sheila Footer, Driving While Intoxicated: A Prosecutor's Viewpoint, TRIAL 40,
42 (Oct. 1984). Judge Albert Kramer received a great deal of national attention and his AA sentencing
program spread throughout Massachusetts and elsewhere. See Jail Time for Intoxicated Drivers, supra note
73, at 31.
"' See, e.g., LANDSTREET, supra note 73, at 54-57 (outlining the Fairfax County, Virginia program).
71 See, e.g., Footer, supra note 77, at 42.
'o The Illinois regulations require only an ongoing support program. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 92, §
1001.440 (b)(3) (1987); 10 I11. Reg. 4558, 4593 (1986). Even if regulations do not specify AA, the
sentencing court or probation department may designate AA as the only suitable way to satisfy the support
program requirement. In these cases, AA is a de facto requirement.
" For example, Fairfax County judges merely sentence the drunk driver to successful completion of
Virginia's Alcohol Safety Action Program. But 50% of V.A.S.A.P. referrals are designated "Level II" pre-
problem drinkers and 30% "Level 1II" chronic alcoholics or problem drinkers. Level III must attend AA
and an alcohol clinic; Level II may have to attend AA. LANDSTREET, supra note 73, at 60-61.
82 In many parts of the country, particularly outside major cities, it is likely AA is the only program to
meet a sentencing requirement. Robin Wood, a counselor with the Queen Anne's County Health Depart-
ment's Alcohol and Drug Abuse Program, offered, "Our overall approach to treatment is oriented heavily
towards AA because we think this is the treatment that works best .... Also, it's the only recourse available
in our area." Ayres, supra note 6, at A12.
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constitutional rights,8 3 the constitutional analysis must be affected by the fact that the
challenged program is a condition of probation.84 Although the choice between jail and
probation arguably offers no choice at all, the defendant essentially chooses AA as part
of probation.85 The voluntary choice of probation and its conditions over jail may render
impotent any constitutional claim of the probationer.
If probation is viewed as a privilege which the state can condition upon any
hardship deemed appropriate,86 this analysis survives. However, the uniformity in drunk
driving sentencing alone counsels that probation also has characteristics of an entitle-
ment.87 The overwhelming majority of first-time drunk drivers do not spend time in
jail.88 Most prefer any probation conditions to avoid jail or loss of license. When AA is
part of probation, and conflicts with the defendant's freedom of religion or other
constitutional rights, the choice between jail and probation alone cannot validate the
state's probation conditions.89 When sentencing uniformly results in probation, and
probation is effectively unavailable to a defendant due to his religion or beliefs, the strict
characterization of probation as a privilege must be examined further.
An inherent difference exists between rights and privileges in the context of
protecting individual liberties. When a government closes a church, it clearly denies an
individual's right to religious beliefs. The conditioning of a government benefit on
characteristics that might conflict with one's beliefs normally does not invoke a similar
gut reaction. If the law treats rights differently from privileges, the difference should be
particularly salient regarding the privilege of probation, because that privilege is relevant
only after the conviction of a crime.
Constitutional protections not only forbid overt denial of rights by the state, but
apply equally to privileges, such as state benefits. Since Sherbert v. Verner,9° government
benefits cannot be denied based on religious beliefs by placing conditions on a privilege
that conflict with the recipient's freedom of religion or expression.9 Conditioning a
benefit otherwise available to citizens upon conduct repugnant to his beliefs puts pressure
83 Sentencing by the court is a state action demanding constitutional protection, as evidenced by
Article III of the Constitution and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, which applies to sentencing. See, for example, Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (discussing
whether it is cruel and unusual punishment to sentence an alcoholic to abstinence).
" But see Heinz Hink, The Application of Constitutional Standards of Protection to Probation, 29 U.
CHI. L. REV. 483 (1962).
8' "The threat of sanctions being reimposed is definitely a strong factor in an individual's cooperation
with treatment," admitted the director of the Virginia Alcohol Safety Action Program. LANDSTREET, supra
note 73, at 71.
86 See Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932) ("Probation is thus conferred as a privilege,
and cannot be demanded as a right."); Ex Parte Trombley, 193 P.2d 734, 741 (1948) (Probation is "an act
of grace and clemency ... and a person is not entitled to it as a matter of right.").
87 Entitlements cannot be conditioned on religious beliefs, nor can free exercise of religion be impeded
by entitlement qualifications. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Vemner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
88 An important exception is those states which enforce mandatory prison sentences for all drunk
drivers. Although the DWI statutes of 25 states include mandatory confinement provisions, the sentences are
rarely enforced for first-time offenders. The actual sentences depend on the drunk driver's history,
circumstances, attitudes of the police, prosecutor, and judge, and available jail space. JAILING DRUNK
DRIVERS, supra note 1, at 3.
" Heinz Hink argued that the Equal Protection Clause could also be the basis for a constitutional
claim against probation conditions. Hink, supra note 84, at 490. This presents an interesting scenario that
clarifies the classification of probation as an entitlement: If 99 first-time DWI defendants are sentenced to
probation, the 100th arguably has a right to a probation that does not violate his First Amendment rights.
90 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9' Id. at 404-405. "It is too late in the day to doubt that liberties of religion and expression may be
infringed by the .. . placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege." Id. at 404.
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on the adherent to violate those beliefs, and violates the freedom of religion.92 Conditions
must be constitutional even if the state has no obligation to award the benefit,93 such as
unemployment compensation or other welfare largesse.
In the context of Sherbert, probation is analogous to other government benefits.
If not for the conflict between AA and the drunk driver's beliefs, probation would be
available. Although the state has no obligation to award probation to drunk drivers,94 it
should not deny this sentencing alternative to some defendants by setting conditions which
conflict with the defendant's religion or beliefs.95
The Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education held that "[n]o person can
be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs." 96 Sherbert and
its progeny make clear such constitutional rights apply not just against government forcing
actions, but also against government conditioning benefits upon actions or beliefs.97
Notably, the benefits cases are void of a significant element relevant to compulsory AA
- the conviction of a crime. Early freedom of religion analysis focused on suffering:
"That no man shall be compelled to ... suffer on account of his religious opinions or
belief."9' A criminal conviction, however, may and should result in suffering, via the
sentence.
The instinct that the constitutional claims of a drunk driver, or any convicted
criminal, should be treated differently is a justifiable one. The conviction has profound
effects on the rights of the drunk driver. The rights of the convict are not absolute, but
are constantly balanced against the state interests of punishment and rehabilitation.99 The
effect of a conviction on constitutional rights presents a fundamental question of whether
constitutional rights, which must be considered when placing conditions on a state
privilege, are equally potent as a basis for a claim against a sentencing program, after
conviction of a crime.
Striking the balance between the interests of the accused and the goverrrment in
eradicating crime is an "undeniably difficult task,"'0 0 but one of the fundamental
92 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981).
13 Even though the state has no obligation to award unemployment benefits, it cannot impose a
condition which inevitably deterred or discouraged the exercise of First Amendment rights of expression.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405 (1963). The state cannot indirectly, via conditions, "produce a result
which the state could not command directly." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). Therefore, if
the state could not compel citizens to go to AA directly, it should not indirectly require it as a precondition
to the benefits of probation.
14 By statute, first time drunk drivers in most states face up to one year in jail. In some jurisdictions,
every drunk driver goes to jail. JAILING DRUNK DRIVERS, supra note 1, at 9 (describing 100% incarceration
rate in Memphis, Tennessee).
" Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). In denying Medicaid funding to non-necessary abortions, the
Supreme Court held that government can regulate the availability of government benefits. However, the
Court noted that the regulation did not require some act to enjoy a benefit, and did not implicate free
exercise because no religion compelled action against the law. Id. at 320. Compulsory AA for probation is
distinguished because it requires a religious/spiritual action to be eligible for probation, and atheists, Jews or
Muslims may be compelled to act contrary to their sentence.
96 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
97 Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 404-405 (1963); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18
(1981); Robinson v. Price, 615 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1980).
" Id. at 13 (quoting Jefferson's Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, 12 HENING, STATUTES OF
VIRGINIA 84 (1823)).
9' See State v. Bouldin, slip op. (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 1985); Hink, supra note 84, at 486-87;
Note, Probation for the Chronic Alcoholic: The Appropriateness of an Abstinence Condition, 22 RUTGERS L.
REV. 787, 790-92 (1968)..
100 Charles Splawn, Note, Enhanced Sentencing Under North Carolina's D.W.I. Statute: Making Due
Process Disappear--Field v. Sheriff of Wake County, N.C., 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 517 (1988).
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obligations of society. "' The protection afforded the convicted offers a unique challenge
to a constitutional system, °2 one which American courts have generally met with a
refusal to shear the constitutional rights of convicts. 103 In fact, the prohibition on
unconstitutional conditions applies to terms of probation. In 1928 the Supreme Court held:
"[T]he state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such
conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that effect is not unlimited
• . . it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional
rights."'' " Therefore, a probation condition that violates any of the probationer's
constitutional rights establishes the illegality of the condition." 5
Countless cases reinforce the assertion that probation conditions can be too
onerous to be constitutional.0 6 For instance, constitutional due process rights even apply
to the right of a prisoner to participate in a temporary release program.'0 7 Furthermore,
a Georgia prison's probation requirement demanding short hair violated the freedom of
expression,0 8 and requiring a probationer to receive permission from a probation officer
before giving public speeches violated the freedom of speech." Notably, a probation
requirement of abstinence from alcohol has been termed "as patently vindictive as
demanding that'a lame person run for his freedom.''' °
These examples"' demonstrate the need to scrutinize the highly personal and
indoctrinating AA counseling requirement. On the other hand, courts have upheld
'0' Id. '[N]ot the least significant test of the quality of a civilization is its treatment of those charged
with a crime, particularly with offenses which arouse the passions of a community." Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717, 729 (1961)(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Drunk driving qualifies as such an emotionally charged
crime, as evidenced by the legislative explosion of the 1980s.
'02 -[T]he strength of a constitutional system lies in the protection it affords those who have
trespassed." Hink, supra note 84, at 485.
1o3 See, for example, People v. Becker, 84 N.W.2d 833, 839 (Mich. 1957), where the Michigan
Supreme Court rejected the notion that the convicted criminal has "any degree of vulnerability, that he is
shom of any of his constitutional rights." Heinz Hink notes that it is particularly important not to differenti-
ate between the rights of the accused and the rights of the convicted in a judicial system committed to
rehabilitation. If public interest is high in rehabilitating offenders, as it is in protecting the accused, then both
groups should enjoy full rights. He argues the advantages of a "flexible" system of justice are lost if
constitutional rights are abandoned post-conviction. Hink, supra note 84, at 485.
' Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926). This is inapposite
to the approach in Hamilton v. Board of Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934), discussed and overruled in Board of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943): "It was held that those who take advantage of [the state's]
opportunities may not on the ground of conscience refuse compliance with such conditions." Id. at 632.
For discussion of the application of constitutional protections to probation conditions, see Note,
Probation for the Chronic Alcoholic: The Appropriateness of an Abstinence Condition, 22 RUTGERS L. REV.
787 (1968), reprinted in DRUNK DRIVING CASES: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 591, 604 (Brian Freeman, ed.
1970) [hereinafter DRUNK DRIVING].
105 DRUNK DRIVING, supra note 104, at 604. This conclusion is bolstered by the high value placed on
freedom of religion and expression in the Constitution and by the Supreme Court.
'06 For examples of cases testing the constitutionality of probation conditions, see State v. Bouldin,
slip op. (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 1985) (upholding the impoundment of a drunk driver's Cadillac for a
year as a condition of probation).
07 MacCowan v. Cummings, 417 N.Y.S.2d 366 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (holding that current participa-
tion in a furlough program constituted a "liberty or property interest," which could not be denied without a
hearing).
'08 Inman v. State, 183 S.E.2d 413, 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971).
" Hyland v. Procunier, 311 F. Supp. 749, 750 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
"o State v. Oyler, 436 P.2d 709, 712 (Idaho 1968).
. See also Butler v. District of Columbia, 346 F.2d 798, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (requiring convict to
write essay as a condition of suspending his sentence was without a basis in law); People v. Pointer, 199
Cal. Rptr. 357, 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding a probation requirement prohibiting conception unconstitu-
tional).
[Vol. 1:2
ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS
probation conditions which clearly implicate constitutional rights, such as the seizure of
property,' 2 forfeiture of pension," 3 forfeiture of the right against warrantless search-
es,"14 and prohibitions on free speech and travel." 5
Probation conditions that infringe on constitutional rights may still be upheld if
narrowly tailored, reasonably related to rehabilitation, and not unduly restrictive of
liberty."6 Nonetheless, it is clear that the convicted drunk driver is entitled to constitu-
tional protection, even in regard to conditions of a probation which is, to some degree,
voluntary. The Hobson's choice between jail and AA does not miraculously cure
constitutional violations. Therefore, developed First Amendment standards warrant
analysis of compulsory AA. The distinction between right and privilege, and the
importance of a criminal conviction should be kept in mind, as these factors set the
framework for constitutional analysis and would undoubtedly flavor a decision reviewing
compulsory Alcoholics Anonymous.
II. COMPULSORY AA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The punishment of alcohol related crimes has proven a fertile ground for
constitutional claims. In addition to Fourth Amendment and due process claims against
drunk driving enforcement methods,'" the Supreme Court and many state courts have
examined the constitutionality of punishing intoxication, which is arguably an involuntary
state for alcoholics."' DWI sentencing and rehabilitation programs have been challenged
on various grounds." 9 Rather than analyze all potential claims of the drunk driver
12 State v. Bouldin, slip op. at 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 1985).
". United States v. Margala, 662 F.2d 622, 627 (9th Cir. 1981).
"4 State v. Schlosser, 202 N.W.2d 136, 139 (N.D. 1972).
"5 Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 334 (10th Cir. 1971).
..6 See, e.g., People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) ("Where a condition of
probation requires a waiver of precious constitutional rights, the condition must be narrowly drawn; to the extent
it is overbroad, it is not reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation and
is an unconstitutional restriction on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights."). In State v. Bouldin, the
Court of Criminal Appeals held: "[Probation requirements] should be reasonably related to his rehabilitation and
not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of religion." State v. Bouldin, slip op. at 6
(Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 1985). Interestingly, an additional condition of probation in Bouldin that was not
challenged was attendance at weekly AA meetings for 18 months. In overturning the constitutionality of another
probation condition, the Tennessee Supreme Court enthusiastically approved AA sentencing: "No question [has
been] raised as to the [AA] condition of probation and we applaud the trial court's resourcefulness." State v.
Bouldin, 717 S.E.2d 584, 585-86 (Tenn. 1986).
17 See cases cited supra note 3.
18 For cases holding that the punishment of addiction or alcoholism by statute or in sentencing is
unconstitutional, see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir.
1966); Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966)(en banc). But see Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514 (1968) (holding that conviction for public drunkenness of one who was to some degree compelled
to drink was not necessarily cruel and unusual punishment); Wickham v. Dowd, 914 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir.
1990) (upholding the constitutionality of 20 year sentence, replacing a 10 year probation sentence after the
failure to remain abstinent because convict was punished for breaking parole, not for alcoholism), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 2897 (1991); Vick v. State, 453 P.2d 342 (Alaska 1969) (rejecting the defense that alcohol
use is a non-volitional act for alcoholics); Burger v. State, 163 S.E.2d 333 (Ga. App. 1968) (equating the
defense of alcoholism for drunk driving with pyromania for an arsonist, kleptomania for a thief, or
nymphomania for a prostitute). For in-depth survey, see Kent Greenawalt, Uncontrollable Actions and the
Eighth Amendment. Implications of Powell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 927 (1969), reprinted in DRUNK
DRIVING, supra note 104, at 463.
"9 For instance, Illinois addressed whether the drunk driver's Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination applies to a pre- or post-sentence alcohol evaluation by the probation department. People v.
Baker, 526 N.E.2d 157 (I11. 1987). See also State v. Leary, 556 A.2d 1328 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989)
(striking down state's mandatory alcohol counseling program because not promulgated within statutory
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against the sentence of mandatory AA,121 this Note focuses on claims of infringements
on individual liberty, specifically the freedoms of religion and expression based in the
First Amendment.
A. Freedom of Religion
If one were to accept Alcoholics Anonymous' self-definition as spiritual, analysis
under the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause might be unnecessary. AA
purports to preempt religiosity by turning to "God as we underst[and] Him,"''
requiring a new awareness and set of beliefs rather than belief in a certain God. Based in
the views of AA and courts that have upheld state partnerships with the organization,'
perhaps AA is more of an ideology than a religion. Of course, at times, the judicial
definition of religion has broadened to the point of including almost any "sincerely held
value position[ ] of sufficient importance to the possessor.' ' 23 Even under a properly
limited definition of religion, however, the foundational beliefs of AA qualify as religious.
Religion should be defined in order to differentiate it from ideology and accord
it the specific protection envisioned by the drafters of the Constitution. 24 In doing so,
Stanley Ingber notes that undoubtedly "the framers['] religion entailed a relationship
between human beings and some supreme being."'1 2' The key to religion, argues Ingber,
is not the name or nature of a supreme being, but the role that "a sacred or transcendental
reality plays in imposing obligations upon the religious faithful."' 2 6 In United States v.
Seeger,127 the Supreme Court affirmed the importance of both a supreme power or being
and obligations imposed thereby: Religion must be "based upon a power or being, or
upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately
dependent."' 
28
authority); State v. Bouldin, 717 S.E.2d 584 (Tenn. 1986) (constitutional due process rights apply to DWI
sentencing).
2o Of course, one legitimate objection is the effectiveness of compelled attendance at an inherently
voluntary group like AA. The effectiveness of AA has been the subject of an exhaustive number of studies,
conflicting in results, and is necessarily avoided as a subject of this note. The Secretary of Health and
Human Services recognized that AA is likely to be effective only for "that specific subgroup of alcoholics
who have lost control over their drinking and believe they are powerless." SPECIAL REPORT ON ALCOHOL
AND HEALTH, supra note 57, at 413. The city of Philadelphia found that, in reference to its court-ordered
treatment program, "lack of intensity combined with the coercive context of the program precluded
meaningful treatment." Nancy Rourke & Phil Harris, Evaluating Your DWI System: It Can Be Sobering, 27
JUDGE J. 15, 18 (Spring 1988). See also JACOBS, supra note 1, at 11: "While drunk drivers have been a
boon for alcohol treatment programs, they have proved a difficult group to treat .... Coerced into treatment
by the criminal court, they often have little motivation to change their behavior." Boston University's Ralph
Hingson stated, "[T]he data about the effectiveness of these [treatment] programs is that they are not all that
effective .... There's obviously less motivation when the commitment is by the court." McAllister, supra
note 2, at 55-56.
121 ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 9, at 59 (Third Step).
122 See, e.g., Youle v. Edgar 526 N.E.2d 894 (I11. App. Ct. 1988).
12 Stanley lngber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 233, 240 (1989).
124 Id. at 233. "Both jurists and scholars frequently have equated religion with conscience. This
equation is puzzling in light of the framers' persistent refusal to approve the many First Amendment drafts
that explicitly guaranteed a right of conscience in addition to religious freedom." Id. at 277.
125 Id. at 250.
26 Id. at 240. "No counterpart [to these obligations] exists in ideologies, even for the ideological
zealot." Id.
127 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
128 Id. at 176.
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AA clearly fits this functional definition of religion. Regardless of whether
"God" is the traditional Christian God, it is a higher power to which AA participants
must "turn [their] will and [their] lives over"' 29 in order to remove their flaws. Because
members must first admit powerlessness, 3 ' their lives, well-being and "all else"
depend upon this power and the AA support system. Because AA goes beyond a mere
ideology into the realm of religion, AA as a probation condition implicates the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.
1. The Establishment Clause
The fact that AA is not a traditional religion, but only a program with the
characteristics of a religion, has an impact on Establishment Clause analysis of the state
action of mandating AA. A judge sentencing drunk drivers to attend church to repent for
the crime would advance religion and foster entanglement between the judicial system and
churches in violation of the Establishment Clause. 3' In sentencing drunk drivers to
attend AA, the state advances the belief of turning to God, or some higher being, to cure
the problems of alcoholism, and fosters entanglement with AA. The latter state action
does not rise to the inherent objectionability of the former, because the religion advanced
is really "quasi-religious.''
Traditionally, Establishment Clause violations have been found when the
beneficiaries of state action are clearly religious, such as Catholic schools' or
Christianity generally.'34 In cases of drunk drivers being sentenced to AA, however, AA
is implementing the state action rather than receiving benefit from it. Additionally, the
sentence is secular in purpose, to rehabilitate the drunk driver. Although a religion of sorts
may be advanced, the principal effect of the action arguably remains rehabilitation.
Entanglement between the government and AA clearly results, yet AA claims to be non-
denominational and non-religious. Although cooperation between courts and AA
implicates the prohibition on religious control of public policy espoused in some
Establishment Clause cases,' the partnership qualifies for the incidental benefit
doctrine more than a constitutional violation under the Lemon test.
29 ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 9, at 59 (The Third Step).
30 Id. at 59 (The First Step).
31 Under the Lemon test, in order to be constitutional under the Establishment Clause, a state action
must have a secular legislative purpose; its principle or primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit
religion; and it must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971).
132 This term has been used by the Supreme Court and connotes ideological foundations which are
similar to, but not based in, traditional religion. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 663 (1972) (using
"quasi-religious" to describe marriage as an institution).
' See Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Lib. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
134 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602
(1971).
135 In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), in upholding cooperation between the government and
religious institutions, the Supreme Court stated "there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on
the other." Id. at 312. The widespread practice of making referrals to AA rather than creating a state neutral
program, arguably represents dependency by the states on a religious organization. The First Amendment
should deny "to every denomination any advantage from getting control of public policy." Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting). AA is part of the public policy on drunk
driving, and because it runs its own program, AA "controls" that aspect of public policy.
WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
In Lynch v. Donnelly,'36 the Supreme Court ruled that a statute or state program
may have the "remote and incidental' 3' effect of advancing religion. The incidental
benefit doctrine is an indication of the judiciary's acceptance of cooperation between the
government and religious institutions in the provision of social services. 3 s The long
history of accommodation of religion where a program's purpose is sufficiently secular
dates back to Bradfield v. Roberts, 39 which affirmed state funding of a Catholic
hospital. Because of the secular purpose, the fact that the hospital was religious in
character was "wholly immaterial.""
The modem strength of the accommodation doctrine is demonstrated in Bowen
v. Kendrick,"' in which the Supreme Court upheld the American Family Life Act
(AFLA). The Act provided grants directly to churches and religious organizations to
provide family planning counseling. The decision demonstrates a high tolerance for
religious involvement in social programs, permitting direct funding and direct enlistment
of religious organizations.'42 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the First Amendment
does not prevent religious institutions "from participating in publicly sponsored social
welfare programs." '3
In cooperating with the courts, AA provides a social service of rehabilitating
alcohol abusers.'" Although AA counseling is highly personal and indoctrinating in
nature, the federally-sponsored counseling approved in Bowen was similarly indoctrinating
and often thoroughly religious.'45 The Court's affirmation of the AFLA public/private
partnership signals the acceptance of AA sentencing. The challenged counselors in Bowen
were clearly religious, not quasi-religious. The AFLA included direct funding, one of the
clearest indications of government support.
AA as a condition of probation is distinguishable from Bowen because the drunk
driver is compelled to attend counseling, whereas no teenagers in Bowen had to seek any
specific counselor. Additionally, AA is often judicially imposed, whereas the Court in
Bowen emphasized the fact that Congress had determined that churches had a valuable
role to play in family counseling.'46 Nonetheless, as a violation of the Establishment
Clause, state support of AA by judicial referral does not exceed the direct funding of
religious counselors upheld in Bowen. The present Court would uphold mandatory AA as
a condition of drunk driving probation under Establishment Clause analysis, as secular in
purpose and only an incidental benefit to a quasi-religious organization.
1 6 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
137 Id. at 683; See also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. 472 U.S.
703, 710 (1985); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
138 See generally Thomas W. Pickrell & Mitchell A. Horwich, "Religion as an Engine of Civil
Policy': A Comment on the First Amendment Limitations on the Church-State Partnership in the Social
Welfare Field, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1981, at I 1I.
"9 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
'04 Id. at 299.
14' 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
142 Id. at 605-06.
'I' Id. at 609.
', This valuable social service might be impossible if states had to fund their own neutral programs,
an important political factor surrounding a constitutional challenge to compulsory AA.
141 In his dissent, Justice Blackmun pointed out the highly religious nature of the counseling, and
objected to giving religious groups a primary counseling role. Bowen, supra note 141, at 625 (Blackmun, J.
dissenting). Analogous to the likelihood that AA counseling as carried out is particularly indoctrinating,
Blackmun noted how blatantly religious the AFLA was in actual administration. Id. at 639 n.9.
' Id. at 606-07. The Court held that the AFLA reflected "Congress' considered judgment that
religious organizations can help solve the problems to which the AFLA is addressed." Id.
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2. Free Exercise
The compulsory nature of the AA requirement, predictably of mild importance
under the Establishment Clause, bolsters a viable constitutional claim under the Free
Exercise Clause. Rather than reviewing only the structure of judicially compelled AA for
unacceptable ties between the government and religion, free exercise analysis examines
the actual impact on individuals when presented with the choice between jail or probation
that includes AA.1
4 7
In mandating AA for drunk drivers, sentencing judges, probation departments,
or state legislatures surely do not set out to infringe the defendant's right to the free
exercise of religion. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has made clear that the strong
language 48 of the Free Exercise Clause is to be "taken seriously even in cases
involving no intentional discrimination against religion.' 49 For instance, in Sherbert v.
Verner,' the Court determined it was unconstitutional to deny state unemployment
benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturday. 5' Disqualifica-
tion from otherwise available benefits was an unacceptable burden on free exercise.'52
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 153 which barred compulsory education for an Amish fifteen-year
old because the education was contrary to his religious beliefs, the Court announced the
free exercise standard: "Only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."'
51 4
Sherbert and its progeny'55 stand for "the proposition that the state must not
require [a] choice [between government benefits and religious principles] unless it has a
compelling interest unattainable by a less burdensome means."' 56 Due to the uniformity
of probation sentencing for drunk drivers, probation qualifies as a government benefit
"otherwise available"'5 7 if not for belief conflicts. Fortunately, free exercise claims
have long applied to probation requirements. 58 For the atheist, Jew, or Muslim faced
with probation involving Christian or supreme being beliefs, the state has required a
choice between the valuable benefit of probation and the individual's religious (or non-
1'7 See generally Rachel Lieberman, Humpty Dumpty and Government Social Welfare Services: A Free
Exercise Perspective on Balancing the Need for Social Services and First Amendment Rights, 6 J. L. & POL.
601 (1990). Lieberman suggests that in evaluating partnerships between government and religion in the
social services field, free exercise is the appropriate standard of inquiry. Id. at 611-12. The limits to religious
provision of services should be determined by the effects on individuals. Id. Free exercise "provides a viable
balancing standard that stays within the bounds of past Supreme Court decisions and makes constitutional
government assistance within the social welfare field possible." Id. at 623.
141 Stephen Pepper points out that while other Bill of Rights provisions contain "buffering language,"
the religion clauses are absolute, straightforward prohibitions and must be taken seriously. Stephen Pepper,
Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 300.
Id. at 308.
'0 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
"' id. at 403.
152 Id.
'5' 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
"4 Id. at 215.
155 See Hernandez v. Commissioner of Intern. Rev., 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment
App. Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
156 Ingber, supra note 123, at 300.
'5 "[Oitherwise available public program" is the term used in Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716.
's See Dunn v. Chicago Indus. School, 117 N.E. 735 (Ill. 1917) (striking down probation sentence
requiring delinquents to attend Catholic school); Jones v. Commonwealth, 38 S.E.2d 444 (Va. 1946)
(holding that probation requirement that delinquents attend church and Sunday school violates the Free
Exercise Clause).
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religious) beliefs. Like the pressure on Sherbert to work on Saturday to avoid indigence,
the pressure upon the drunk driver "to forego that [religious] practice is unmistak-
able."' 59
The critical step for the free exercise claim involves the evaluation of the
governmental interest and whether the means were least restrictive. Given the astronomical
costs to the public of drunk driving,"6 the apparent government interest of combatting
drunk driving and rehabilitating those convicted is high. 6 ' However, Yoder demonstrates
that even the most compelling state interest, such as compulsory education for children
under sixteen, can bow to the religious rights of citizens. This result in Yoder was due
partly to the nature of the balancing test between individual rights and state interest. In
Yoder, the Supreme Court adjudged the specific state interest rather than the general state
interest."' Therefore, as Stephen Pepper explained, the interest in Yoder was not
compulsory education generally, but education of the Amish beyond eighth grade, or the
state's interest in refusing to grant the Amish an exception.'63 Pepper defined this test:
"[T]he state must prove that such an exemption is not practicable before it can win a free
exercise case, usually a very difficult task."' 64
Under this test, the state interest in mandatory AA is not the war against drunk
driving or alcoholism, but the interest in refusing to grant an exception or to provide an
alternative to the convict whose religious beliefs conflict with AA. This narrow interest
is not compelling. It would be possible for judges or probation officers to create
alternatives for those who reasonably object. 65 Presumably, the identical rehabilitation
purpose could be served by mandating "another alcoholism treatment or support group
approved by the court.' ' 166 Therefore, anytime a sentence specifies AA as a condition,
it fails the least restrictive means test. Under the free exercise test as conducted in Yoder,,.
AA as a probation condition arguably fails both the compelling interest and least
restrictive means prongs.
However, recent free exercise cases indicate that the Yoder free exercise test,
particularly the narrowly defined state interest, is not intact. In Bowen v. Roy, 167 which
held that requiring a social security number for government benefits did not infringe the
free exercise of native Americans, 68 the Court did not measure the state interest at the
margins. Rather than evaluating the interest in not granting an exception, the Court
measured broadly the importance of a uniform system of benefits administration. 69
159 Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). "[llndirect 'discouragements' undoubtedly have the
same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions, or
taxes." Id. at 404 n. 5 (quoting American Comm. Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)). See also
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 707.
' More than 25,000 people are killed each year in drunk driving accidents, and one million more are
injured in alcohol related accidents. Bruce & Bruce, supra note 2, at 178. See also Vicki Quade, War on
Drunk Driving: 25,000 Lives at Stake, 68 A.B.A. J. 1551 (1982).
161 See Youle v. Edgar, 526 N.E.2d 894, 898 (I11. App. Ct. 1988).
162 Pepper, supra note 148, at 310.
163 Id.
'6 Id. at 311-12.
165 The availability of alternative probation conditions was important in the judge's determination that
AA could not be required in State v. Norfolk. See Transcript of Disposition at 9-10, State v. Norfolk, Crim.
No. 3588 (Cir. Ct. Queen Anne's Co., Md. Mar. 16, 1989).
" This approach is common in sentencing courts. In some jurisdictions, however, there is no suitable
alternative support group, or the probation department may explicitly require only AA. See LANDSTREET,
supra note 73, at 71 (describing the mandatory referral of problem drinkers to AA by Fairfax County
probation officers).
67 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
1 Id. at 699-701.
'69 Id. at 707.
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Chief Justice Burger wrote: "[T]he Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to
require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the
religious beliefs of particular citizens." 7 0 Lyng v: Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n,'7 ' in which the Court approved a state road through land sacred to Indians,
indicated that the threshold for when a state action infringes on religious beliefs is
high. 72 In Employment Division v. Smith,'73 the Court explained that a free exercise
claim does not invalidate a law with a secular purpose, even if the law infringes or
prohibits a religious activity.
74
Roy, Lyng, and Smith indicate a shift in "taking free exercise seriously.'
'175
Measured broadly, the state interest in clearing the streets of drunk drivers is undeniably
high. Otherwise, however, mandatory AA for drunk drivers does not fit squarely within
the cases.
In Bowen, the Court held that the government could not be required to alter an
"internal procedure" that conflicted with a citizen's beliefs.' 76 Although judicial referral
to AA is part of a state policy of addressing drunk drivers, the personal nature of AA,
unlike a social security number requirement, prevents its classification as a mere "internal
procedure.' ' 177 The Court was unconvinced that the state road would infringe religious-
exercise in Lyng. 71 In contrast, requiring an atheist to attend a program referencing God
or forcing a Jew to recite the Lord's Prayer clearly violates the participant's religious
beliefs and practice. 79 The Court's reliance in Smith on the legislature's right to validly
proscribe even religious activities 80 would be analogous only if a drunk driver claimed
that his conviction for drunk driving violated his religious liberty. Challenging the
resultant rehabilitation program is far different. The constitutional claimant objects to the
beliefs and activity compelled by the state action, not a valid governmental prohibition on
religious activities.
Most important, each of the recent free exercise cases distinguishes compulsion
by the government, either toward certain religious beliefs or against an individual's
religious beliefs.' 8' Coercion is the "linchpin"'1 82 of the Free Exercise Clause and is
still expressly prohibited. Both Smith and Lyng maintain that government can neither
compel a belief nor penalize for a different belief.8 3 The Court emphasized that in
neither Roy nor Lyng would "the affected individuals be coerced by the Government's
action into violating their religious beliefs; nor would either governmental action penalize
religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and
70 Id. at 699-700.
171 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
172 See id. at 450. The state action must coerce action contrary to religious beliefs, not merely make
the practice of religion more difficult. The "crucial word ... is 'prohibit."' Id. at 451.
' 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
174 id. at 67 1.
'75 See Pepper, supra note 148, at 299.
176 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 700.
177 Id.
178 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449.
179 These acts compel action against religious beliefs, prohibited even in the most recent free exercise
cases. See Smith, 485 U.S. at 670; Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448; Roy, 476 U.S. at 703.
'o "The protection that the First Amendment provides ... does not extend to conduct that a state has
validly proscribed." Smith, 485 U.S. at 671.
18' See Smith, 485 U.S. at 670; Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448 ("Free exercise protects individuals from certain
forms of government compulsion"); Roy, 476 U.S. at 703.
182 Ingber, supra note 123, at 303.
'" See supra note 179.
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privileges enjoyed by other citizens."' 84 The present Court recognizes a vital difference
between making it more difficult to practice a religion and coercing one to act contrary
to religion, with the latter resulting in constitutional protection.'85
Even under a strict coercion standard for free exercise violations, compulsory AA
is unconstitutional. Both compulsion (toward the beliefs and activities of AA) and
penalization (for adhering to religious beliefs contrary to AA) are evident when AA is
mandated as a condition of probation. Because AA is religious in nature, state compulsion
to attend AA violates the free exercise rights of drunk drivers with religious beliefs
contrary to those of AA." 6
The constitutional free exercise claim, however, will not apply to probationers
who are simply offended by the AA program, or find the powerlessness requirement
discomforting. Free exercise claims require the individual's objection to be religious, not
merely philosophical or personal.'87 In distinguishing between "personal preference"
and religion, courts may look for group organization, religious conviction, and an intimate
relation between the religious beliefs and daily living.'
Devout Jews, Muslims, Hindi, Buddhists, atheists, and others have viable free
exercise claims under the present standard. Because of the intensely personal and highly
indoctrinating nature of the AA program, the constitutional inquiry goes beyond a basis
in religion. Other probationers may object to state compulsion to admit powerlessness and
indoctrination toward permanent reliance on a support group. This group will find a
constitutional haven in the freedom of expression or freedom of conscience guaranteed
by the First Amendment.
B. Freedom of Expression and the Broader Freedom of Conscience
Since Board of Education v. Barnette,189 the Supreme Court has emphasized
that the freedom of expression prohibits the state from requiring a citizen to recite speech
or adopt state-sponsored beliefs.' 9° In Barnette, the Court indicated that the freedom of
speech includes the freedom not to speak utterances repugnant to the speaker.'9' The
AA participant, however, is not technically required to utter words, such as the pledge of
allegiance in Barnette. Therefore, it is most valuable to investigate the freedom of
conscience, which serves as the foundation for the freedoms of expression, religion, and
the entire First Amendment.'92
This broader "freedom of mind"' 93 protects the citizen from even state
requirements such as a license plate counseling "Live Free or Die."' 94 Constitutional
4 Lyng, 485 U.S at 449.
'8 Id. at 450.
186 This is so whether the compulsion emanates from the court, the probation department, or the
legislature.
187 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
"8 Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir. 1980).
89 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
"0 Id. at 642.
9' Id. at 633-34; See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); William P. Marshall,
Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545, 567 (1977).
192 Constitutional jurisprudence cites a broad freedom of thought or conscience as the basis for First
Amendment freedoms. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
Marshall, supra note 191, argues that difficult free exercise cases should be evaluated under the often
ignored freedom of expression. Id. at 545.
193 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
'94 Id. at 7 15.
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jurisprudence based on the freedom of conscience is important to drunk drivers because
it expands the scope of the constitutional objection to mandatory AA to include those
affronted by the philosophy of AA.
The drafters of the Bill of Rights argued "the rights of conscience are, in their
nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental
hand."' 19 5 The Supreme Court affirmed that the freedom of belief was of overriding
importance, not incidental or secondary: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein."' 1
9 6
At a minimum, AA as a parole condition prescribes that the beliefs of AA shall
be the orthodox approach to treating drunk drivers. The state that mandates AA arguably
forces citizens to accept or express their faith in AA by demanding attendance.
Because the freedom of religion can be viewed as a subset of the freedom of
conscience,'97 the modern restriction of constitutional claims based in religion signals
that cursory analysis under a broad freedom of conscience is inappropriate. The Court has
allowed secular policies to clearly advance religion in Establishment Clause cases, 9 ' and
allowed secular policies to hinder the practice of religious beliefs when faced with Free
Exercise challenges.'99 The Justices might similarly approve a policy to rehabilitate
drunk drivers even though its ideological foundations are incompatible with an
individual's conscience. Despite this trend, the degree of coercion toward beliefs inherent
in AA revitalizes a freedom of conscience claim.
Three modern cases extend the freedom of conscience to wholly secular
2002contexts." Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,2 ' Elrod v. Burns, °2 and Branti
v. Finkel0 3 essentially conclude that government benefits cannot be denied based on the
beliefs of the denied claimants.
In Abood, the Court struck down a statute which required employees to pay
agency shop dues, used for ideological purposes, or face the penalty of losing a
government job.2°4 The statute effectively required support of beliefs through financial
assistance. Justice Stewart wrote: "[A]t the heart of the first amendment is the notion that
an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs
should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.
' 215
The level of coercion that results from mandatory funding of beliefs falls far short of the
coercion of attendance at meetings where beliefs are forcefully espoused. Additionally,
the foundational beliefs of AA are more intensely personal than the choice of a political
party.
"95 Abington v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203, 231 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Rep. Daniel
Carroll of Maryland during the debate upon the proposed Bill of Rights in the First Congress, August 15,
1789, 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730).
"9 Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1947).
117 "Freedom of thought, which includes the freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free
men." United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
'g See supra notes 136-145 and accompanying text.
'9 See supra notes 167-175 and accompanying text.
200 Marshall, supra note 191, at 570.
'0' 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
202 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
203 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
24 431 U.S. at 234-35.
205 ,
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Both Elrod and Branti prohibited political beliefs as a prerequisite for
government jobs.2 °6 In all three cases, the loss of employment was a rights infringement
serious enough to warrant protection of the freedom of conscience. The rights infringe-
ment in the mandatory AA scheme, the denial of probation, which perhaps results in jail
time, compares favorably. 207 Because a state action coerces fundamental personal beliefs
at the risk of losing an important right, AA as a condition of probation violates the
freedom of conscience of those drunk drivers whose beliefs conflict with AA doctrine.
However, none of the successful freedom of conscience claims involved the
compulsion of a belief in the course of sentencing or rehabilitation, which counsels
revisiting the effect of a conviction on constitutional rights. If a convicted robber believes
that robbery is justifiable, the state can coerce the criminal toward the belief that robbery
is an inappropriate means of livelihood and counsel another belief system. The drunk
driver who objects to the philosophy of AA, however, need not argue that drunk driving,
or even alcohol use, is acceptable. Rather, the drunk driver objects to the belief system
requisite for AA: admitting powerlessness, turning to God, permanently relying on AA
for sobriety, and accepting that AA is the only suitable route to rehabilitation.2 s
An objection of this nature is analogous to the "affirmation of a belief and an
attitude of mind ' ' 209 prohibited in Barnette and falls within the protected freedom of
conscience. Although the goal of rehabilitation of drunk drivers is laudable, even the most
worthwhile goals do not permit state compulsion of beliefs.
210
A freedom of conscience claim undoubtedly would be flavored by the present
Supreme Court's restricted view of individual liberties, as well as the criminal conviction
of the claimant. Nonetheless, it is unlikely the framers, who prohibited the infringement
of "the full and equal rights of conscience. . . on any pretext, ' 21' envisioned the
abandonment of this right following a misdemeanor conviction.
Like the free exercise claim of those with conflicting religious beliefs, the
freedom of conscience claim for those with conflicting personal beliefs fits within current
judicial interpretation of the Constitution's guarantee of individual liberty. The viability
of both claims rests largely on the clear compulsion by the sentencing court to attend a
program religious in nature, as well as the highly personal and indoctrinating nature of
AA counseling.
C. Judicial Approaches to Constitutional Objections to AA
On few occasions have courts addressed a constitutional claim against AA as a
condition of probation. One of the rare cases in which the constitutional claim was given
" In Elrod, the Court held it was unconstitutional to require a pledge of loyalty to the Democratic
party in order to keep government jobs. 427 U.S. 347. In Branti, the Court held that firing assistant public
defenders because of political beliefs violated the First Amendment freedoms of belief and association. 445
U.S. at 515-16.
207 While the right to livelihood is protected as an individual liberty, the Constitution highlights
incarceration as a uniquely protected violation of rights, evidenced by the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.
208 Arguably, state compulsion of the belief that the drunk driver's alcohol use is a problem or that
abstinence is required is equal grounds for a freedom of conscience objection. Given the strong public policy
against drunk driving and the high correlation between alcohol abusers and drunk driving, suggestions of
abstinence or curbing drinking are much more directly related to the rehabilitation of drunk drivers than the
concepts of powerlessness and salvation.
209 Board of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943).
210 For instance, the goals of civic virtue and patriotism did not warrant compulsory recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance. Id.
21 McGowan v. Maynard, 366 U.S. 420, 440 (1961) (quoting James Madison, I ANNALS OF CONG.
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more than a cursory response is State v. Norfolk.212 John Norfolk, a 47-year-old house
painter and atheist, was convicted of driving while intoxicated and sentenced to twenty
days in jail. The sentence was suspended in favor of eighteen months probation including
weekly attendance at AA.
Objecting to the religious nature of the AA meetings and literature, Norfolk
contacted the probation department and told them he could not as an atheist go to the
meetings, but was willing to complete some other kind of treatment. His probation officer
informed Norfolk "that he indeed had to attend the A.A. meetings as directed and he was
advised to block out the religious references at those meetings to the best of his
ability." ' 3 Clearly this "block out" approach does not pass constitutional muster, for
even the opportunity for students to remain silent or leave the room did not validate non-
denominational prayer in schools. 2 4 Norfolk enlisted the ACLU, which argued to the
Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County that the probation condition violated the
Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and Article 36 of the Maryland
Constitution.2"5
The relief sought was simple: Norfolk was "willing to participate in any
alternative treatment modality ... so long as it does not interfere with his free exercise
of his non-religion. ' 2 1 6 The state of Maryland capitulated that the specific AA
requirement was unreasonable and, rather than prosecute for violation of probation, agreed
to have the circuit court determine new conditions of probation. 2 7
Judge John Sause focused on his view that coercing beliefs, even in the name of
rehabilitation, is ineffective: "[M]ankind has yet found few ways to correct... behavior
• .. unless that individual is willing to be rehabilitated. ' 21 1 Implicitly affirming the
religion objections, the court took a broad view that compelling attendance at an
organization, when objected to "for whatever reason," is impermissible. 219 The
acceptance of -the constitutional arguments was made easier by the simplicity of the
solution. The court ruled that Norfolk, and future drunk drivers, should create a program
for their rehabilitation in conjunction with the parole department, and present it to the
court at sentencing, thereby avoiding constitutional conflicts with conscience or
religion.2
Unlike most decisions regarding the. prosecution and punishment of drunk drivers,
Judge Sause's discussion notably lacked consideration of the general state interest in
combatting drunk driving and rehabilitating offenders. The public toll of drunk driving is
unquestionable, and a state sentencing structure that rehabilitates problem drinkers is
highly desirable. Not surprisingly, these overriding state interests permeate other decisions
on the constitutionality of AA as a condition of probation.
212 Crim. No. 3588, (Cir. Ct. Queen Anne's Co., Md. Mar. 16, 1989).
213 Ayres, supra note 6, at A12.
214 See Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
215 See Defendant's Memorandum to the Court, State v. Norfolk, No. D713675 (Dist. Ct. Queen
Anne's Co., Md. 1988).
216 Id. at 2.
217 Transcript of Disposition at 2-3, State v. Norfolk, Crim. No. 3588, (Cir. Ct. Queen Anne's Co.,
Md. Mar. 16, 1989).
211 Id. at 6.
219 Id. at 7. Judge Sause also held that mandatory AA created an unfair presence of the courts and the
state within the AA organization. "[Aim I going to add to the burden of those [AA members] who are
trying to help themselves by sending in someone who doesn't want to be there[?]" Id. at 9.
220 Id. at 10-11.
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In Youle v. Edgar, 22 ' rather than investigate the claimed religious nature of AA,
an Illinois appellate court cited the positive purpose of AA: "The primary function of
Alcoholics Anonymous is to cope with the disease of alcoholism. It is a well-recognized
support program, in part, because it achieves a measure of success.- 222 The important
public policy of highway safety also minimized the court's acceptance of the constitutional
challenge.223 The Secretary of State's drunk driving sentencing rules were "designed"
to keep drunk drivers off the road, by ensuring "that problematic users of alcohol prove
they have a support system that makes them deal with their problem."
224
A fatal flaw of Youle's freedom of religion challenge to Illinois' DWI probation
regulations was that the administrative rules225 merely required participation in a
"support-recovery program," not specifically AA.226 Illinois judicial interpretation of
the rules sheds light on the purpose of the rules and their clear impact on freedom of
conscience. Like AA, the Illinois rules are not aimed at the concrete goal of mere
sobriety, but require a fundamental change in belief and self-identity. 227 The Illinois
appellate court refused to disturb the administrative finding at Youle's hearing that,
"When considered in the context of alcoholism, sobriety becomes indicative of an attitude
or way of thinking - a manner of living - not simply non-intoxication."
221
In Koeck v. Edgar,229 the drunk driver's revoked driver's license was not
reinstated because he had not adhered to AA: "[The] [p]laintiff never worked on any of
the AA steps, although ... he worked toward his goal, which was to stop drinking.
' 230
Carried out in this fashion, even the nonspecific requirement of support group participa-
tion unconstitutionally infringes on individual liberty.
Unfortunately, the few cases which involve a constitutional challenge to AA as
a probation requirement23' lack in-depth analysis of the issue. The cases do reveal the
balance that would prove determinative in full scale constitutional analysis: post-
conviction respect for the drunk driver's individual liberties versus the unquestionable
public policy favoring punishment and rehabilitation of drunk drivers.
Alcoholics Anonymous has been used as an element of sentencing for various
crimes other than drunk driving. Judicial scrutiny of AA as a condition of probation in
other contexts offers insight into how far the state can go in compelling changes in belief.
Courts have conditioned visitation and parental rights of alcoholic parents upon AA
treatment. 232 Unemployment compensation has been denied to employees who refused
to attend AA.233 And in State v. Big Head,234 the defendant's failure to follow court-
221 526 N.E.2d 894 (I11. App. Ct. 1988).
222 Id. at 899.
223 Id. at 898.
224 Id.
225 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 92, §§ 1001,440(b)(3) (1987); 10 11. Reg. 4558, 4593 (1986).
226 Youle, 526 N.E.2d at 899.
227 Id. at 897.
228 id.
229 535 N.E.2d 1019 (I11. App. Ct. 1989).
230 Id. at 1021.
231 In addition to Youle v. Edgar and State v. Norfolk, see Farmer v. Coughlin, No. 84 Civ 7587, 1987
WL 27664 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1987); Jaco v. Shields, 507 F. Supp. 67 (W.D. Va. 1981) (Cases where the
issue was raised but declared moot).
232 See In re William B., 533 A.2d 16 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987); In re Mary Ann F.F., 514 N.Y.S.2d
536 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Johnson v. Allen, 504 N.Y.S.2d 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
233 See Torgeson v. Goodwill Indus. Inc., 391 N.W.2d 35 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Henson v.
Employment Sec. Dep't, 779 P.2d 715 (Wash. 1989).
234 363 N.W.2d 556 (S.D. 1985).
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recommended attendance at AA after prior DWI convictions resulted in a harsher sentence
in the instant case for a vehicular homicide.235
Clearly the law may confront alcoholism through criminal statutes or through
additional probation requirements. In People v. Hoy,236 which affirmed the conviction
and imprisonment of an alcoholic for public drunkenness, the Michigan Supreme Court
justified such requirements. Because the disease of alcoholism can be cured, the court
explained, laws and sentences can promote the cure.237
However, in the same opinion in which he extolled "the great message" of
AA2 38 and cited AA's spiritual recovery as the best answer to alcoholism,
239
Michigan's Justice Brennan emphasized that compulsion to spiritual recovery was a
violation of individual liberty: "Surely we would like all our people to be sober. Just as
we would like them to be brave, loyal, courteous, reverent, and true."2 40 Although it
would be best for all alcoholic violators of law to be "lectured to," "given spiritual
help," and "placed in close association with other alcoholics, ' 2 4' it must be done by
choice. 242 "[T]hat's the way it is in a free society," explained the court.24 3
In Karl v. State,2" the Court of Appeals of Alaska struck down attendance at
AA meetings as a probation requirement because there was no evidence that AA offered
the correct treatment for the individual defendant. 245 In Henson v. Unemployment
Security Department,246 the dissenting justice elaborated on why AA attendance should
not be compelled.247 Quoting an appreciative AA member, Judge Durham argued that
AA "does not work for everyone." '248 There are "strong religious and spiritual elements
of the AA program that many alcoholics have difficulty embracing." '249 Durham cited
another study, which found "AA is best suited to individuals who are 'open to spiritual
values,' and . . . ineffective when it conflicts with an individual's culture or personali-
ty.' 250
So, although courts have validated conditioning important rights upon AA
participation, they also have advocated strong constitutional and efficacy arguments
against compelling attendance at a spiritual rehabilitation program.
D. Conclusions under the Constitution
The opposite approaches to the constitutional challenge to mandatory AA
demonstrated by state courts in Norfolk and Youle, as well as conflicting judicial views
235 Id. at 563.
236 158 N.W.2d 436 (Mich. 1968).
237 Id. at 441.
231 "[A]lcoholics can recover. Drunkards can stay sober. This is the great message of 'Alcoholics
Anonymous.' " id. at 444.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 443.
242 id.
243 id.
244 770 P.2d 299 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (reversing AA as condition of probation for defendant
convicted of intoxicated shooting spree).
245 Id.
246 779 P.2d 715 (Wash. 1989) (Durham, J., dissenting).
247 Id. at 721-22.
241 Id. at 722.
249 Id. (quoting N. ROBERTSON, GETTING BETTER, INSIDE ALCOHOLICs ANONYMOUS 112 (1988)).
250 Id. at 722 (citing Young & Lawson, AA Referral for Alcohol Related Crimes: The Advantages and
Limitations, 28 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 131 (1984)).
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of the general appropriateness of using AA in sentencing, signal the complexity of the
issue. For further consideration, the Wisconsin legislature adopted a law which forbids
mandatory AA treatment. 25' At the same time, numerous state enactments support AA's
valuable role in the community. 2 or even require full-scale partnership between the
state and AA.253 Likewise, some commentators state emphatically that compulsory AA
violates the Free Exercise Clause.2"4 Others would require, if our laws are to rehabilitate
offenders, AA or stricter counseling as part of probation for as long as it takes for the
defendant to be "cured" of alcoholism.
255
This disparity does not merely reflect the lack of strict First Amendment analysis
of AA as a probation condition. For while mandatory AA sentencing technically falls
within the current judicial protection of freedom of religion and freedom of conscience,
status as a constitutional violation is not secured. The disparity in views highlights the
central underlying question which will greatly impact a constitutional decision: whether
courts and policy makers should demand a strict view of constitutional rights (including
those of convicted drunk drivers), or should defer to lawmakers and sentencing judges in
addressing the difficult problem of punishing and rehabilitating drunk drivers.
It would be unwise to conclude the unconstitutionality of AA as a condition of
probation without investigating the balance between individual rights, constitutional rights,
and popular public policy.
III. BALANCING PUBLIC POLICY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
The partnership between sentencing judges and AA violates the drunk driver's
rights to free exercise of religion and the freedom of conscience. However, as the Court
intimated in Zorach v. Clauson,25 6 "[t]he problem, like so many problems in constitu-
tional law, is one of degree." 257 No matter how well the Court articulates the constitu-
tional standards of the First Amendment, the judiciary essentially will balance the
251 Gasbarro, supra note 6, at D5.
252 For statutes offering tax exemptions to AA, see ME. REV. STAT, ANN. tit. 36 §§ 1760-67 (West
1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-4-9 (1989) (Attorney General's opinion that AA falls under tax
exemption for property owned by religious society). For statutes exempting AA from alcohol and drug
treatment center licensing requirements, see IOWA CODE ANN. § 125.13.2.e (West 1992); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 222.290-(1); MD. CODE ANN, HEALTH-GEN. § 8-403(c)(2) (1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
11 IB, § 2 (West 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 3-415(C) (West 1992). See also COLO. REV. STAT. §
8-73-108(4)(b)(IV)(C) (1992) (allowing full unemployment benefits to a substance abuser who has agreed to
participate in AA); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:415.1.A.(2), 32:430.F.(1) (West 1992) (allows person with
suspended driver's license to drive to and from AA meetings); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-307.01 (1990)
(requires state mental hospitals to provide or cooperate with an AA program and be trained in AA methods).
253 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-307.01 (1990) (hospitals treating alcoholism shall cooperate with AA
and ensure an adequate number of attendants are certifiedly familiar with AA program); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
143B-262.1 (1990) (the corrections department's substance abuse program "shall include extensive follow-
up ... including active involvement with Alcoholics Anonymous"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4097a (4)
(1992) ("physicians and medical students need to be educated in the recognition and treatment of the disease
of alcoholism including but not limited to the availability of such groups as Alcoholics Anonymous, Alanon
and Alateen.").
2-4 See Lieberman, supra note 147, at 622 (citing John Norfolk's case as the example of a serious free
exercise infringement that could never be justified no matter how valuable the social service involved); see
also Michael Seng, Religion and Rehabilitation: Must the Courts Keep them Separate?, 78 ILL. B. J. 240,
243 (May 1990); Gasbarro, supra note 6, at D5.
255 See Eric Gouvin, Drunk Driving and the Alcoholic Offender: A New Approach to an Old Problem,
12 AM. J. L. & MED. 99 (1986); JACOBS, supra note 1, at 183.
256 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
255 Id. at 314.
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governmental interest served by the program against the burdens on constitutional rights
posed by the state action.258
Since Davis v. Beason,259 which held that the freedom of religion does not
prohibit laws forbidding polygamy, the Supreme Court has clarified that even deeply held
religious or spiritual beliefs can succumb to important public policies." For example,
in Employment Div. v. Smith, a uniform policy prohibiting use of illicit drugs was
adequate policy grounds to infringe upon free exercise rights. 26' Bowen v. Roy indicates
that even the government interest in maintaining a uniform system of benefits administra-
tion overcomes religious beliefs.262
On the other hand, the lofty social goals of compulsory education,263 patrio-
tism,2" and uniform administration of benefits2 65 have fallen to religion or conscience
claims. The Supreme Court has held that religious rights are particularly worthy of
vigilant protection.266 In a bygone era of vigilant protection of individual liberty by the
Supreme Court, public policy would not even enter the balance where conscience or
religion rights were concerned: "[The] validity of the asserted power to force . . . to
profess any statement of belief or to engage in any ceremony of assent to one, presents
questions of power that must be considered independently of any idea we may have as
to the utility of the ceremony in question. '2 67 Hendrick, Roy, and Smith indicate that
the present Court is not as "serious" about First Amendment rights and will not ignore
compelling government interests. When lawmakers express that a religious organiza-
tion can play an effective role in policy, the judiciary is inclined to defer.269 Therefore,
the policy-rights balance must be conducted.
The broadest government policy involved is the state's interest in combatting
drunk driving, a serious problem which has been recognized by the Supreme Court.27 °
In South Dakota v. Neville, the Court stated: "[Drunk driving] occurs with tragic
frequency on our nation's highways. The carnage caused by drunk driving is well
documented." 27 ' Perhaps the most relevant policy interest is the state's interest in
addressing drunk driving through rehabilitation. This is of clear importance to legislatures
that have revamped DWI statutes to include a counseling element.272 Unlike mandatory
jail sentences or other anti-drunk driving strategies, rehabilitation programs address the
25 "If abridgement is very serious, the social goals can never be worth the constitutional price."
Lieberman, supra note 147, at 622. For a rare and explicit recognition of this balance, see O'Connor
Hospital v. Superior Ct., 240 Cal. Rptr. 766 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
259 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
21 Id. See also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
261 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
262 Roy, 476 U.S. at 703.
263 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
264 Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
265 Sherbet v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
266 Committee Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 789 (1973).
267 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634.
265 This is so because these cases lean towards requiring coercion of beliefs in order to violate the
First Amendment; merely benefiting one religion or making it more difficult to practice a religion or hold
beliefs is no longer sufficient to demand constitutional protection.
269 An interesting question, in those cases where there is no statutory or regulatory basis for AA
sentencing, is whether the same policy deference is due judges who mandate AA.
"0 See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17-19
(1979).
271 Neville, 459 U.S. at 558. See also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 657, 672 (1971) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) ("The slaughter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the death toll of all our wars.").
272 See supra note 5.
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problem at its roots and prevent the serious problem of recidivist offenses.273 Collateral
policy interests include the importance of effective probation in the penal system 274 and
the maintenance of a vital partnership between government and religious groups in
providing social services.275 These factors represent a strong public policy concern.
However, a dispositive distinction is that the strong government interest in
rehabilitation compels some type of counseling or support group aspect to probation, not
necessarily AA. The state interest in compelling AA specifically, if other effective sources
of rehabilitation are available, is unjustifiable.
The absolute importance of the infringement on religious freedom by compulsory
AA should be guaranteed under the Constitution and its unconditioned, express prohibition
on state actions which violate free exercise. Still one might argue that only a small
percentage of individuals' rights are affected, or that violations are minor because the
responsible source is. a quasi-religious organization, not a church. In conducting the
balance, however, the minor or subtle nature of the First Amendment infringement does
not dilute its import:
"[I]t is no defense to urge that religious practices here may be
relatively minor encroachments of the First Amendment. The breach of
neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a
raging torrent and, in the words of Madison, 'it is proper to take alarm
at the first experiment on our liberties.' "276
Because the freedom of belief is the "fixed star in our constitutional constellation,' 2 77
the intrusion on the individual's right of conscience should be accorded a high value.
Admittedly, the constitutionality of AA as a condition of drunk driving probation
is determined by how serious one is about protecting constitutional rights.27 As Robin
West describes, the current trend in legislatures and the judiciary favors deference to
popular initiatives over "liberal legalism" and individual rights, particularly when
confronting lawlessness:2 79
"Americans... [have] moved collectively towards the conclusion that
a strong respect for individual rights and freedom is a luxury this drunk-
driving, drug-crazed, flag-burning, peyote-taking, child-abusing, sexually
promiscuous, violently criminal nation cannot afford and that our most
273 A 1970 study found 27% of drunk driving arrestees had prior DWI convictions. LANDSTREET,
supra note 73, at 49. Another study indicated that 55% of drunk drivers had prior convictions for alcohol-
related offenses. Id. at 6.
274 Part of the state interest in probation generally is to minimize jail sentences to prevent overcrowd-
ing. "One way the [judiciary] can do its part [to address jail overcrowdingl is by fashioning imaginative and
innovative conditions of probation to allow eligible defendants ... to serve . . . 'outside the walls,' rather
than needlessly confine nonviolent offenders." State v. Bouldin, slip op. at 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21,
1985). For the effect upon the judicial system of mandatory jail sentences for drunk driving, see JAILING
DRUNK DRIVERS, supra note I.
275 The Attorneys General of seven states filed an amicus brief in Bowen v. Kendrick which warned
that disrupting the partnership between churches and the government "could seriously jeopardize a
substantial portion of the nation's most effective social services." Lieberman, supra note 147, at 611 n. 63.
276 Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
277 Board of Educ. v. Barette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
278 For instance, one who believes the only satisfactory way to combat drunk driving is to require AA
for all offenders will not be inclined to respect the offender's constitutional claim, because it directly
conflicts with the strong interest of preventing drunk driving.
279 Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1990).
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fundamental institutions - and our constitutional jurisprudence -
ought to reflect that judgement." 211
The constitutional claim of convicted drunk drivers like John Norfolk need not
rely on a judiciary bearing the torch of individual liberty. Regarding the limited inquiry
of whether AA as a condition of probation violates an individual's First Amendment
rights, the question is not so difficult.
Faced with a choice between jail or conditioned probation, the state compulsion
to attend AA is unquestionable. Denying probation to those whose religious beliefs
conflict with AA unmistakably coerces beliefs and actions contrary to an individual's
religion in violation of even the current free exercise standard. The condition also compels
adoption of the religious principles of AA, as part of the price of a misdemeanor
conviction. The intensely personal and indoctrinating nature of AA counseling also
warrants protection to the individual under freedom of conscience, which dictates that
beliefs must be arrived at through one's own mind, not coerced by the state. Although the
government's policy interest in punishing and rehabilitating drunk drivers is undeniably
high, the interest in rehabilitation through AA specifically, without exceptions or
alternatives, is not compelling.28" ' Finally, the conclusion of unconstitutionality is
facilitated by readily available cures to the impermissible state requirement and the
relative simplicity thereof.
82
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CURES TO COMPULSORY AA
Fortunately, subtle infringements283 on constitutional rights caused by a judicial
sentencing structure require only subtle modifications. Various cures to AA as a probation
condition would allow the government's drunk driving policy and rehabilitation program
to remain intact and effective while preserving the individual rights of those who object
to compulsory AA.
The easiest and most favorable cure is for the sentencing court to offer an
alternative which serves the same counseling or support group function of AA, but lacks
the religious or indoctrinating characteristics.284 The probation option could be offered
to all drunk drivers at sentencing, or reserved for those who express an objection to AA.
Rational Recovery (RR), a support group to keep alcoholics sober, was designed
280 Id. at 44.
281 This step in the analysis arguably constitutes measuring state interest at the margin, which the
Supreme Court may disfavor. Those cases measuring general interest, however, did not involve government
programs which compelled religious or spiritual beliefs.
282 The availability of constitutional cures affects constitutional decisions. See Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972). The alternative of at-home religious and parental education made it easier for
the Court to exempt the Amish from compulsory education. Id.
283 The term "subtle" is appropriate not because the rights involved are not important or because state
compulsion is not express. Rather, the sentencing scheme does not fit tightly into existing constitutional
standards. The organization involved is quasi-religious rather than a traditional religion. The state
compulsion to attend AA is clear, but it follows a conviction and is closely related to rehabilitation of the
crime. The source of state action in most cases is judicial sentencing, not statute. Finally, in many cases, an
alternative to AA may satisfy probation, but be unavailable geographically or disfavored by the probation
department, creating a de facto compulsion to AA.
2"4 "For over 40 years after its inception in 1935, Alcoholics Anonymous was the only national self-
help organization for alcoholics." BUFE, supra note 26, at 123. Numerous alternatives to AA now exist,
including Women for Sobriety, Men for Sobriety, Save Our Selves/Secular Organizations for Sobriety, and
Rational Recovery. Id. at 123-127.
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specifically to offer a philosophical alternative to AA. 285 Rather than requiring power-
lessness and turning to God as prerequisites to recovery, RR focuses on individual
responsibility and personal solutions to alcohol abuse. RR also avoids "replacing one
addiction with another, ' 286 as participants need not continue to attend the counseling
sessions after attaining confident sobriety. Private counseling could also be a satisfactory
alternative, but is less favored because, unlike AA, it costs money. A practical problem
for this cure is that the minimal number of non-AA support groups, as compared to AA's
73,000 chapters,287 may not provide a sufficient alternative. 8
Another approach, which recognizes the importance of the rights violation, is to
simply offer an exception to those drunk drivers with a sincere religious or philosophical
objection to AA. However, this alternative would require evaluating the sincerity of the
claimant's beliefs which is particularly tricky in the context of freedom of conscience.
289
This approach also could result in abandoning the rehabilitation aspect of the sentence for
a significant percentage of drunk drivers, which renders it unacceptable.
A cure related to the above offerings is the method adopted by Judge Sause in
State v. Norfolk.2 0 To guard against any violation of individual beliefs, the convicted
drunk driver would create a personalized rehabilitation initiative. The proposal would be
developed along with and approved by the judge or probation department to ensure it
satisfied the components of meaningful rehabilitation. "Window dressing" would be
rejected. 29' While this liberty-ensuring approach might be practicable in rural Queen
Anne's County, Maryland, it has limited utility for mass justice systems lacking judicial
and administrative person-hours.
The creation of a neutral counseling program by the state presents an obvious
cure, but this proposal instantly creates fear and resistance in the present atmosphere of
budgetary restraint. The existence of the legislative and financial support necessary for
such an effort is not impossible, given past state commitments to solving the plague of
DWI.292 It is, however, dubious. The rhetorical commitment of the federal government
to a rehabilitation approach to drinking offenses dates back to 1947.293 The commitment
was never funded until the Alcohol Safety Action Program (ASAP) demonstration projects
from 1975-1988. ASAP funding was terminated because of limited statistical success.
Aside from the politically implausible approach of a state neutral program, cures
to the constitutional violation of compulsory AA are logical, readily available, and easy
25 See Gasbarro, supra note 6, at D5.
286 Id.
217 There are roughly 73,000 AA chapters. SPECIAL REPORT ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH, supra note
57, at 412. RR has roughly 1,000 chapters. Gasbarro, supra note 6, at D5.
28 Although this Note focuses on the constitutional rights of first time drunk drivers at sentencing, the
offering of rehabilitative/counseling options raises an interesting question regarding recidivist offenders: If a
drunk driver chooses non-religious, non-AA counseling that fails, can the judge then mandate attendance at
AA following the second conviction? The religious rights involved are the same, but arguably the state
interest in rehabilitation compels AA after the failure of a secular program.
289 In free exercise cases, the court cannot judge the "truth" or reasonableness of an individual's
religious beliefs, but only whether the beliefs are sincerely held. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87
(1944). If the same perspective held true for freedom of conscience, it is hard to imagine how a court could
overrule someone's personal beliefs or philosophies, which could easily conflict with those of AA.
290 See Transcript of Disposition at 7-12, State v. Norfolk, Crim. No. 3588 (Cir. Ct. Queen Anne's
Co., Md. Mar. 16, 1989).
29 Id. at 11.
292 For example, the state of Washington created two new separate prison facilities to accommodate
drunk drivers serving their mandatory jail sentences on the weekends. Mandatory jail sentencing itself is a
significant funding and personnel commitment. See generally JAILING DRUNK DRIVERS, supra note 1.
293 Joseph Little, Challenges to Humanitarian Legal Approaches for Eliminating the Hazards of Drunk
Driving, 4 GA. L. REV. 251 (1970), reprinted in DRUNK DRIVING, supra note 104, at 719, 731.
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to implement. The sentencing court or probation department must simply require the drunk
driver to participate in a counseling program effective in rehabilitating alcoholics and
problem drinkers, rather than require AA. Most importantly, these cures offer the "best
of both worlds" in the challenging arena of drunk driving policy: states can maintain an
effective element of rehabilitation in drunk driving sentencing, and individuals convicted
of drunk driving will not have to sacrifice the constitutional freedoms of religion and
conscience in order to avoid a jail term.
V. CONCLUSION
Alcoholics Anonymous, although it plays a vital role in rehabilitating thousands
of alcoholics, is religious, spiritual and indoctrinating in character. AA as a condition of
probation, whether its source is legislative or judicial, comprises a state action compelling
attendance at AA. This compulsion violates the free exercise or conscience rights of those
who hold religious or personal beliefs contrary to those of AA. The constitutional
infringements are not justified by a specific compelling interest of the state. Judges and
legislatures should offer curative alternatives to AA conditions, thereby allowing effective
rehabilitation of drunk drivers to coincide with full protection of fundamental constitution-
al rights.
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